Break from Law School equals Vacay in Boracay

I think that travel comes from some deep urge to see the world, like the urge that brings up a worm in an Irish bog to see the moon when it is full. ~Lord Dunsany

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The most exhausting part of Law School is the Final Exams. That’s why students are always looking forward to a long summer break. I’ve learned to reward myself with anything every after exams. When I survived my first year in Law School, I had a very big treat from my mom. My family went to Boracay for a vacation. In addition to this, I was allowed to bring along my boyfriend. And my brother was also allowed to bring his girlfriend. What more can I asked for?

As expected, I was daunted with the beauty of Boracay. For me it’s the best beach in the Philippines. I love the white sand, the smell of the sea, the people, the nature, and everything you could see in that place. There’s so many things to see and so much to experience in just one place. The activities that we tried there are Island hopping, banana boat, helmet diving and flying fish. Still, there is more that we haven't tried. Like parasailing, scuba diving, glass bottom boat,zorb, cliff diving, and reef walking and many more. Of course, the best thing about being young and being in Boracay is the night life. We never missed a night to have fun, dance, laugh drink and meet strangers who are hella cool inside the clubs of Boracay. The best part of my 2010 is summer. Now I’m looking forward to another visit in the island. It’s a heaven that made me forget about hell for a while.


The photo above was taken on our last day at Boracay. Before we left, I gazed at the whole Island and silently prayed that I'll be back next year.I even promised to save money and search some cheap flights plan another trip and give myself a very big reward every time I survive another year in Law School.
To my fellow students of law, learn to give yourself a reward as well. Always have something to look forward to, forget about the Law close your books for a while and plan a trip. There’s more to see outside the corners of Law School. Summer break is 2 months away. And maybe this is also a good time to spend time with your family like what my family did. Book your flights now!

**Read full story of my trip to Boracay here.

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This post is an entry to Sulit na Sulit Travel contest. Join the contest and get the chance to win a trip to Hong Kong for two.

PEOPLE V SUMAYA CASE DIGEST G.R. Nos. 93281-84. November 17, 1994.]

TOPIC: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 111

FACTS: Accused-appellant Gregorio Sumaya y Dalogdog was charged with rape and attempted rape in four (4) separate informations before the RTC of Iligan City. During the pendency of the appeal, accused-appellant died of cardio-pulmonary arrest at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, where he was detained. plaintiff-appellee filed its comment citing the ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego and urging that while the death of accused-appellant extinguished his criminal liability, the civil liability remains.

ISSUE/HELD:WON the civil liability of the accuse was extinguish by his death. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

In the recent ruling laid down in People vs. Rogelio Bayotas, this Court held: ". . . Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal." The present case deals with civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the offenses charged in the criminal cases. The records do not disclose any civil liability of the accused-appellant possibly arising from other sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict or law. Consequently, we see no further need to discuss the merits of the appeal.

The present case deals with civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the offenses charged in the criminal cases. The records do not disclose any civil liability of the accused-appellant possibly arising from other sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delicit or law. Consequently, we see no further need to discuss the merits of the appeal.

PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994.

Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111

FACTS: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUE/HELD: WON death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability? AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

'ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

"When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."

What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter.

In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

"Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable."

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

CHU VS Court of Appeals Case Digest G.R. No. 49588. December 21, 1990

Topic: Criminal Procedure Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS: Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos filed a criminal case against before petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee" with estafa. Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a common fund. As an offshoot of the criminal case, private respondents filed a civil action 4 against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising from guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents' failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action.

the appellate cour held that the civil action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of said resolution, but the same was denied.

ISSUE/HELD: WON a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. NEGATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that "(I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of evidence is required. An acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action.

The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. 10 In the case of Bonite v. Zosa, 11 it was held that:

"Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective."

JERVOSO VS PEOPLE Case Digest G.R. No. 89306. September 13, 1990

Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS:

In this petition for review, the petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification of the penalty only, the decision of the trial court which convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso, but which appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The trial court and the Court of Appeals also convicted his wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against the deceased.

Petitioner’s contention: The Court of Appeals erred in ordering them (petitioners) to pay indemnity of P30,000 to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso despite the reservation by said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused, which they did file in the RTC. "

ISSUE/HELD: WON the filing of separate civil action precludes the offended party from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by the heirs of the deceased victim is authorized under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide (Madeja vs. Cruz) Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.

The second assignment of error raises a purely factual issue: whether the evidence is sufficient to convict the accused of homicide. That issue may not be reviewed by this Court in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only legal issues may be raised.

CASUPANAN VS LAROYA CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002

Topic: Criminal Procedure: Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.

Casupanan and Capitulo’s contention: that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.

Laroya’s contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states that it is with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's order dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict — without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.