Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest L-69866 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function

ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. ⁶ To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. ⁷ For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. ⁸

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29, 1975

TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. ² So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.

Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond repair.

In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.

ISSUES/HELD:

whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.

ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant

whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Except for Madella who was merely acting under orders.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.

Under the old Constitution ⁷ the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. ⁸

We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior officer. ²¹ It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same, ²² that he impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. ²³ Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

Break from Law School equals Vacay in Boracay

I think that travel comes from some deep urge to see the world, like the urge that brings up a worm in an Irish bog to see the moon when it is full. ~Lord Dunsany

Sulit.com.ph and Trajet Tours and Travel promote tourism in the Philippines and abroad. Find great travel deals at Sulit.com.ph, the leading online classified ads website in the Philippines.

The most exhausting part of Law School is the Final Exams. That’s why students are always looking forward to a long summer break. I’ve learned to reward myself with anything every after exams. When I survived my first year in Law School, I had a very big treat from my mom. My family went to Boracay for a vacation. In addition to this, I was allowed to bring along my boyfriend. And my brother was also allowed to bring his girlfriend. What more can I asked for?

As expected, I was daunted with the beauty of Boracay. For me it’s the best beach in the Philippines. I love the white sand, the smell of the sea, the people, the nature, and everything you could see in that place. There’s so many things to see and so much to experience in just one place. The activities that we tried there are Island hopping, banana boat, helmet diving and flying fish. Still, there is more that we haven't tried. Like parasailing, scuba diving, glass bottom boat,zorb, cliff diving, and reef walking and many more. Of course, the best thing about being young and being in Boracay is the night life. We never missed a night to have fun, dance, laugh drink and meet strangers who are hella cool inside the clubs of Boracay. The best part of my 2010 is summer. Now I’m looking forward to another visit in the island. It’s a heaven that made me forget about hell for a while.


The photo above was taken on our last day at Boracay. Before we left, I gazed at the whole Island and silently prayed that I'll be back next year.I even promised to save money and search some cheap flights plan another trip and give myself a very big reward every time I survive another year in Law School.
To my fellow students of law, learn to give yourself a reward as well. Always have something to look forward to, forget about the Law close your books for a while and plan a trip. There’s more to see outside the corners of Law School. Summer break is 2 months away. And maybe this is also a good time to spend time with your family like what my family did. Book your flights now!

**Read full story of my trip to Boracay here.

Wanna see Boracay? Find the best cheap travel packages, not only in Boracay but also in other places at:

And

This post is an entry to Sulit na Sulit Travel contest. Join the contest and get the chance to win a trip to Hong Kong for two.

PEOPLE V SUMAYA CASE DIGEST G.R. Nos. 93281-84. November 17, 1994.]

TOPIC: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 111

FACTS: Accused-appellant Gregorio Sumaya y Dalogdog was charged with rape and attempted rape in four (4) separate informations before the RTC of Iligan City. During the pendency of the appeal, accused-appellant died of cardio-pulmonary arrest at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, where he was detained. plaintiff-appellee filed its comment citing the ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego and urging that while the death of accused-appellant extinguished his criminal liability, the civil liability remains.

ISSUE/HELD:WON the civil liability of the accuse was extinguish by his death. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

In the recent ruling laid down in People vs. Rogelio Bayotas, this Court held: ". . . Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal." The present case deals with civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the offenses charged in the criminal cases. The records do not disclose any civil liability of the accused-appellant possibly arising from other sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict or law. Consequently, we see no further need to discuss the merits of the appeal.

The present case deals with civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the offenses charged in the criminal cases. The records do not disclose any civil liability of the accused-appellant possibly arising from other sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delicit or law. Consequently, we see no further need to discuss the merits of the appeal.

PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994.

Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111

FACTS: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

ISSUE/HELD: WON death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability? AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

'ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

"When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."

What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter.

In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

"Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable."

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

CHU VS Court of Appeals Case Digest G.R. No. 49588. December 21, 1990

Topic: Criminal Procedure Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS: Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos filed a criminal case against before petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee" with estafa. Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each party to contribute to a common fund. As an offshoot of the criminal case, private respondents filed a civil action 4 against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation for recovery of damages arising from guaranty and fraud, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3 and by private respondents' failure to reserve their right to file a separate civil action.

the appellate cour held that the civil action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent of the criminal case and that the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu do not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for damages against them. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of said resolution, but the same was denied.

ISSUE/HELD: WON a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. NEGATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that "(I)n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision, only a preponderance of evidence is required. An acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages, for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no moment in the civil action.

The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved because the law itself already makes the reservation. 10 In the case of Bonite v. Zosa, 11 it was held that:

"Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action, has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective."

JERVOSO VS PEOPLE Case Digest G.R. No. 89306. September 13, 1990

Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS:

In this petition for review, the petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification of the penalty only, the decision of the trial court which convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso, but which appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The trial court and the Court of Appeals also convicted his wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against the deceased.

Petitioner’s contention: The Court of Appeals erred in ordering them (petitioners) to pay indemnity of P30,000 to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso despite the reservation by said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused, which they did file in the RTC. "

ISSUE/HELD: WON the filing of separate civil action precludes the offended party from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:

The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by the heirs of the deceased victim is authorized under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide (Madeja vs. Cruz) Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.

The second assignment of error raises a purely factual issue: whether the evidence is sufficient to convict the accused of homicide. That issue may not be reviewed by this Court in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where only legal issues may be raised.