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Tuesday, October 26, 2010

TANEDO VS BERNAD 165 SCRA 86


FACTS: The private respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated in Cebu City which he had inherited from Lourdes Cardenas. On Lot 7501-A is constructed an apartment building, while the improvements on Lot 7501-B consist of one four-door apartment of concrete and strong materials; one two-storey house of strong materials; a bodega of strong materials; and a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of Lots 7501-A and 7501-B. A small portion of the apartment building on Lot 7501-A also stands on Lot 7501-B.

On 5 February 1982, said Antonio Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Eduardo C. Tañedo.

Antonio Cardenas, on that same day, also mortgaged Lot 7501-B to said Eduardo C. Tañedo as a security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P10,000.00.

Antonio Cardenas further agreed that he would sell Lot 7501-B only to Eduardo Tañedo in case he should decide to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot 7501-B services Lot 7501-A and the apartment building on Lot 7501-A has a part standing on Lot 7501-B. This was confirmed in a letter, dated 26 February 1982, wherein Antonio Cardenas asked Tañedo not to deduct the mortgage loan of P10,000.00 from the purchase price of Lot 7501-A "because as we have previously agreed, I will sell to you Lot 7501-B."

Antonio Cardenas, however, sold Lot 7501-B to the herein respondent spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. 4 Upon learning of the sale, Eduardo Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Romeo Sim. But the latter refused. Instead, Romeo Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. As a result, Eduardo Tañedo, invoking the provisions of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code, filed an action for legal redemption and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, docketed therein as Civil Case No. CEB-994, against the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim, Antonio Cardenas and his wife Mae Linda Cardenas, the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, and Banco Cebuano, Cebu City Development Bank.

Answering, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim claimed that they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo. Antonio Cardenas, upon the other hand, admitted that he had agreed to sell Lot 7501-B to Eduardo Tañedo and claimed by way of cross-claim against the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed in favor of said spouses was only intended as an equitable mortgage, to secure the payment of amounts received by him from said spouses as petty loans .

In answer to the cross-claim, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim insisted that the sale executed by Antonio Cardenas of Lot 7501-B in their favor was an absolute one.

ISSUE: WON the easement of septic tank is extinguish by the sale of the lot to the respondent spouses. NEGATIVE. In the deed of sale it it was not stated that the easement was abolished nor did Antonio Cardenas stopped its use. Its use continued by operation of law even after the sale

RATIO DICIDENDI:

As can be seen from the above provisions, the alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.

n the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.

GARGANTOS V YANON CASE DIGEST .R. No. L-3598, July 24, 1908

FACTS: Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the poblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.

On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application.

Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view trough the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of

The kernel of petitioner's argument is that respondent never acquired any easement either by title or by prescription. Assuredly, there is no deed establishing an easement. Likewise, neither petitioner nor his predecessors-in-interest have ever executed any deed whereby they recognized the existence of the easement, nor has there been final judgment to that effect. Invoking our decision in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 24), petitioner maintains that respondent has not acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally forbidden petitioner from performing any act which would be lawful without the easement, hence the prescriptive period never started.

ISSUE/HELD: WON Yanon acquired easement by virtue of the deed of sale. AFFIRMATIVE it should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates

It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article 621, N.C.C.) and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owner by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered by Article 541, O.C.C (now Article 624, N.C.C) which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence (Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil., 403). It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates (Articles 530, O.C.C., now Articles 613, N.C.C).

We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's property. By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating the two estates.

Sunday, October 24, 2010

AMOR V FLORENTINO


SYLLABUS

1. EASEMENTS; LIGHT AND VIEW AND "ALTIUS NON TOLLENDI"; REQUIREMENT UPON THE OWNER OF SERVIENT ESTATE; NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE EASEMENTS. — The easement of light and view and easement not to build higher (altius non tollendi) go together because an easement of light and view requires that the owner of the servient estate shall not build to a height that will obstruct the window. They are, as it were, the two sides of the same coin. While an easement of light and view is positive, that of altius non tollendi negative.

2. ID.; MODES OF ESTABLISHING AND ACQUIRING EASEMENTS. — According to article 536, Civil Code, easements are established by law or by will of the owners. Acquisition of easements is first by title or its equivalent and secondly by prescription.

3. ID.; WHAT CHARACTERIZES ITS EXISTENCE. — Under article 541 of the Civil Code, the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence.

4. ID.; WHEN AN EASEMENT IS DEEMED CREATED; NOBODY CAN HAVE AN EASEMENT OVER HIS OWN PROPERTY. — The easement is not created till the division of the property, inasmuch as a predial or real easement is one of the rights in another's property, or jura in re aliena and nobody can have an easement over his own property, nemini sua res servit.

5. ID.; REQUISITE OF EASEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 530 OF CIVIL CODE. — The requisite of an easement as required by article 530 of the Civil Code is that there must be two proprietors — one, of the dominant estate and another, of the servient estate.

6. ID.; THE PRESENT CASE AND THAT OF CORTES vs. YU-TIBO (2 PHIL., 29), DISTINGUISHED. — The present case is distinguished from that of the case of Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 29), that in the latter it involved acquisition of easement by prescription, while in the present case the question is the acquisition of easement by title, or its equivalent, under article 541 of the Civil Code. While a formal prohibition was necessary in the former case in order to start the period of prescription, no such act is necessary in the present case because of the existence of the apparent sign which is a sufficient title in itself to create the easement.

7. ID.; EASEMENT ENJOYED BY FORMER OWNER SUBSISTS AFTER DIVISION OF ESTATE IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTRACT TO THE CONTRARY. — When an estate is divided between different persons, and in the contract nothing is said about a mode of enjoyment different from that used by the original owner thereof, the necessary easements for said mode of enjoyment are understood to be subsisting.

8. ID.; LAW OF EASEMENT PRIOR TO CIVIL CODE IS THE SAME AS IN THE LATTER. — The same principle enunciated in article 541 of the Spanish Civil Code was already an integral part of the Spanish law before the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1889, and, therefore, even if the case should be governed by the Spanish law prior to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have to be upheld.

9. ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE LAWS OF EASEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE CIVIL CODE. — The prescriptive period under the Partidas was 10 years between persons who were present, and 20 years between absentees. (4 Manresa, 605.) According to article 537 of the Civil Code, continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription for 20 years. Under sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the period is 10 years.

10. ID.; RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS OF LAND BURDENED WITH APPARENT EASEMENTS. — Purchasers of lands burdened with apparent easements do not enjoy the rights of third persons who acquire property, though the burden is not recorded.

11. ID.; EASEMENTS EXIST SIDE BY SIDE WITH OWNERSHIP. — Absolute and unlimited dominion is unthinkable because it would destroy and defeat itself, inasmuch as proper enjoyment or property requires mutual service and forbearance among the adjoining estates. It is thus that easements, whether created by law or established by will of the parties, must perforce exist side by side with ownership.

FACTS: It appears that over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. On September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel Florentino, one of the respondents herein, and to Jose Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse and the lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnacion Florentino. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1892, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the windows in question. On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the warehouse thereon to the petitioner, Severo Amor, the deed of sale stating that the vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. In January, 1938, petitioner destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house. On March 1st of that year, respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from building higher than the original structure and from executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through the four windows referred to. The Court of First Instance found on the 15th of the same month that the construction of the new house had almost been completed, so the court denied the writ of preliminary injunction.

"Art. 541. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed."

ISSUE/HELD: whether or not Article 541 applies to a division of property by succession. AFFIRMATIVE. there is an implied contract between them that the easements in question should be constituted.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

These two easements necessarily go together because an easement of light and view requires that the owner of the servient estate shall not build to a height that will obstruct the window. They are, as it were, the two sides of the same coin. While an easement of light and view is positive, that of altius non tollendi is negative. Clemente de Diego states that when article 538 speaks of the time for the commencement of prescription for negative easements, "it refers to those negative easements which are the result and consequence of others that are positive, such as the easement not to build higher, or not to construct, which is indispensable to the easement of light."

It will thus be seen that under article 541 the existence of the apparent sign in the instant case, to wit, the four windows under consideration, had for all legal purposes the same character and effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of light and view by the respondents upon the death of the original owner, Maria Florentino. Upon the establishment of that easement of light and view, the concomitant and concurrent easement of altius non tollendi was also constituted, the heir of the camarin and its lot, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, not having objected to the existence of the windows. The theory of article 541, of making the existence of the apparent sign equivalent to a title, when nothing to the contrary is said or done by the two owners, is sound and correct, because as it happens in this case, there is an implied contract between them that the easements in question should be constituted.

If we do not apply article 541 of the Civil Code — and we cannot apply it because Maria Florentino died in 1885 — there is really a gap in the case for the respondents, but none in the case for the petitioner. 1 Under the Partidas, or rather in the absence of an express provision therein similar to article 541, the petitioner should win; and since the parties litigant herein are entitled to have their case decided in accordance with the pre-Civil Code legislation in force in the Philippines as provided in the transitory provisions, since that legislation without any "gap-filling" is in favor of the petitioner, and since to "fill the gap" would prejudice him and unduly favor the respondents, the Court should abstain from so doing as a matter of law and justice.

First, as to the modes of establishing and acquiring easements. According to Article 536, easements are established by law or by will of the owners. Acquisition of easements is first by title or its equivalent and secondly by prescription. What acts take the place of title? They are mentioned in Articles 540 and 541, namely, (1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign between two estates, established by the owner of both, which is the case of article 541. Sanchez Roman calls such apparent sign under article 541 "supletoria del titulo constitutivo de la servidumbre."

standpoint of justice and public policy

— When Maria Encarnacion Florentino, as one of of the devisees, accepted the camarin and the lot, she could not in fairness receive the benefit without assuming the burden of the legacy. That burden consisted of the service in fact during the lifetime of the original owner, which service became a true easement upon her death.

It is not just to allow Maria Encarnacion Florentino or her successor in interest to repudiate her own undertaking, implied, it is true, but binding nevertheless. This easement is therefore a burden which Maria Encarnacion Florentino and her successor in interest willingly accepted. They cannot now murmur against any inconvenience consequent upon their own agreement.

During the construction of the new house by the petitioner, the respondents filed an action to stop the work. But petitioner continued the construction, so that when the Court of First Instance was ready to pass upon the preliminary injunction, the work had almost been finished. Petitioner, therefore, cannot complain if he is now ordered to tear down part of the new structure so as not to shut off the light from respondents' windows.

When petitioner bought this lot from the original coheir, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, the windows on respondents' house were visible. It was petitioner's duty to inquire into the significance of those windows. Having failed to do so, he cannot now question the easement against the property which he purchased.

VI

Recapitulating, we believe the easement of light and view has been established in favor of the property of respondents, for these reasons:

1. Maria Florentino having died in 1892, according to a finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, which we cannot review, Article 541 of the Civil Code is applicable to this case.

2. Granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino died in 1885, nevertheless the same principle embodied in article 541 of the Civil Code was already an integral part of the Spanish law before the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1889, and therefore, even if the instant case should be governed by the Spanish law prior to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have to be upheld.

3. The easement under review has been acquired by respondents through prescription.

4. The petitioner was not an innocent purchaser, as he was in duty bound to inquire into the significance of the windows.

5. Justice and public policy are on the side of the respondents.

COSTABELLA CORPORATION V COURT OF APPEALS 193 scra 333


1. CIVIL LAW; EASEMENT; RIGHT OF WAY; CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION. — It is already well-established that an easement of right of way is discontinous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES OF COMPULSORY DEMAND THEREOF. — Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.

FACTS: It is admitted that the Costabella Corp. owns the real estate properties designated as Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre, situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another route across its property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass. (Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it.)

As a direct consequence of these closures, an action for injunction with damages was filed against the petitioner by the private respondents on September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. In their complaint, the private respondents assailed the petitioner's closure of the original passageway which they (private respondents) claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" that had been existing before World War II and since then had been used by them, the community, and the general public, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to and coming from Lapu-Lapu City and other parts of the country. The private respondents averred that by closing the alleged road right of way in question, the petitioner had deprived them access to their properties and caused them damages. In the same complainant, the private respondents likewise alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter's property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris and flotsam on the beach. They also claimed that the debris and flotsam that had accumulated prevented them from using their properties for the purpose for which they had acquired them.

Petitioner’s contention: petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through its property and counter-averred, among others, that it and its predecessors-in-interest had permitted the temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of, or passage through, its property by the private respondents and others by mere tolerance and purely as an act of neighborliness. It justified the walling in of its property in view of the need to insure the safety and security of its hotel and beach resort, and for the protection of the privacy and convenience of its hotel patrons and guests. At any rate, the petitioner alleged, the private respondents were not entirely dependent on the subject passageway as they (private respondents) had another existing and adequate access to the public road through other properties. With respect to the dike it allegedly constructed, the petitioner stated that what it built was a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property and not a dike as claimed by the private respondents. Moreover, contrary to the private respondents' accusation, the said construction had benefited the community especially the fishermen who used the same as mooring for their boats during low tide. The quantity of flotsam and debris which had formed on the private respondents' beach front on the other hand were but the natural and unavoidable accumulations on beaches by the action of the tides and movement of the waves of the sea. The petitioner's answer then assailed the private respondents' complaint for its failure to implead as defendants the owners of the other properties supposedly traversed by the alleged ancient road right way, indispensable parties without whom no final adjudication of the controversy could be rendered.

Now before us, the petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent appellate court is grossly erroneous and not in accord with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.

The petition is meritorious.

ISSUE/HELD: WON Costabella is obliged to open its properties for the use of the private respondents. NEGATIVE. Easement of right of way cannot be acquired by prescription and the respondents were not able to establish a valid claim of compulsory right.

RATIO DICIDENDI

It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Based on the foregoing, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.

." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, "there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it."

Hence, the private respondents' properties cannot be said to be isolated, for which a compulsory easement is demandable. Insofar therefore as the Appellate Court declared the case to be proper as a controversy for a compulsory right of way, this Court is constrained to hold that it was in error.

Servitudes of right of way are an ancient concept, which date back to the iter, actus, and via of the Romans. They are demanded by necessity, that is, to enable owners of isolated estates to make full use of their properties, which lack of access to public roads has denied them. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, they are compulsory and hence, legally demandable, subject to indemnity and the concurrence of the other conditions above-referred to.

But while a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudical to the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest. According, however, to one commentator, "least prejudice" prevails over "shortest distance." Yet, each case must be weighed according to its individual merits, and judged according to the sound discretion of the court. "The court," says Tolentino, "is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a roundabout way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline."

BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO. INC. V CA Digest

FACTS: Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents Sergio Valdez etc. purchased from Feliciana Santillan a parcel of unregistered land with an area of one hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares, located in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu. He took possession of the property and declared it for tax purposes in his name. Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of the land from north to south was already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. (hereafter Bomedco). The tracks were used for hauling sugar cane from the fields to petitioner’s sugar mill. When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in 1948, herein private respondents inherited the land. However, unknown to them, Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965. The entire subject land was divided into three. However, Lot No. 954, the narrow lot where the railroad tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared for tax purposes in its name.

It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands. Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the legal basis for Bomedco's claim over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded, as was their subsequent demand for payment of compensation for the use of the land.

, respondent heirs filed a “Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property and Damages with Application for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction” against Bomedco before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Respondent heirs alleged that, before she sold the land to Valdez, Sr. in 1935, Santillan granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years. When Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected the grant. The right of way expired sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using the land because one of them was then an employee of the company.

On the other hand, Bomedco’s principal defense was that it was the owner and possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 954, having allegedly bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to the sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. in 1935. It also contended that plaintiffs’ claim was already barred by prescription and laches because of Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of the property for more than 50 years.

ISSUE/ HELD: WON petitioner acquired ownership of the easement through prescription. NEGATIVE. 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet been complied and there was neither laches.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts showed that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the land, petitioner would not have consistently used the phrases “central railroad right of way” and “sugar central railroad right of way” in its tax declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would have found no need for these phrases. A person cannot have an easement on his own land, since all the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his general right of ownership.

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another.

Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot now assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription started from that year.

The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner’s possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right.

The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to respondents’ was when it filed a claim over the property in 1965 during the cadastral survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and until the filing of the complaint for the recovery of the subject land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only 24 years had lapsed. Since the required 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet been complied with in 1989, petitioner never acquired ownership of the subject land.

Neither can petitioner find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it.

Records show that respondent heirs only learned about petitioner’s claim on their property when they discovered the inscription for the cadastral survey in the records of the Bureau of Lands in 1989. Respondents lost no time in demanding an explanation for said claim in their letters to the petitioner dated March 1, 1989 and April 6, 1989. When petitioner ignored them, they instituted their complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on June 8, 1989.

Petitioner contends that, even if it failed to acquire ownership of the subject land, it nevertheless became legally entitled to the easement of right of way over said land by virtue of prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code:

Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.

The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains denotes the existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by title and not by prescription.

To be sure, beginning 1959 when the original 30-year grant of right of way given to petitioner Bomedco expired, its occupation and use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 came to be by mere tolerance of the respondent heirs. Thus, upon demand by said heirs in 1989 for the return of the subject land and the removal of the railroad tracks, or, in the alternative, payment of compensation for the use thereof, petitioner Bomedco which had no title to the land should have returned the possession thereof or should have begun paying compensation for its use.

SOLID MANILA BIO HONG TRADING CO. V CA G.R. No. 90596

FACTS: Petitioner Corporation, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, The private respondent's (de Guzman) title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way: a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila and that the three meterwide portion of said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less, had actually been expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the Metro Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record).

The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.

ISSUE/ HELD: Whether or not an easement exists on the property even after the property was sold. AFFIRMATIVE. Easement cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale “excluded” it, because as a mere right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintains an independent existence. Thus:

Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.

The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).

Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. 15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.

In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and cannot militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action.

Quiroga vs. Parsons Hardware L-11491

Topic: Agency to Buy and sell

SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: Quiroga grants the exclusive right to sell his beds in the Visayan Islands to J. Parsons defendant violated the following obligations: not to sell the beds at higher prices than those of the invoices; to have an open establishment in Iloilo; itself to conduct the agency; to keep the beds on public exhibition, and to pay for the advertisement expenses for the same; and to order the beds by the dozen and in no other manner. As may be seen, with the exception of the obligation on the part of the defendant to order the beds by the dozen and in no other manner, none of the obligations imputed to the defendant in the two causes of action are expressly set forth in the contract.and plaintiff alleged that the defendant was his agent for the sale of his beds in Iloilo, and that said obligations are implied in a contract of commercial agency.

ISSUE: whether the defendant, by reason of the contract hereinbefore transcribed, was a purchaser or an agent of the plaintiff for the sale of his beds.

HELD: the contract by and between the plaintiff and the defendant was one of purchase and sale, and that the obligations the breach of which is alleged as a cause of action are not imposed upon the defendant, either by agreement or by law.

REASONING:

that the plaintiff was to furnish the defendant with the beds which the latter might order, at the price stipulated, and that the defendant was to pay the price in the manner stipulated. The price agreed upon was the one determined by the plaintiff for the sale of these beds in Manila, with a discount of from 20 to 25 per cent, according to their class. Payment was to be made at the end of sixty days, or before, at the plaintiff's request, or in cash, if the defendant so preferred, and in these last two cases an additional discount was to be allowed for prompt payment. These are precisely the essential features of a contract of purchase and sale.

There was the obligation on the part of the plaintiff to supply the beds, and, on the part of the defendant, to pay their price. These features exclude the legal conception of an agency or order to sell whereby the mandatory or agent received the thing to sell it, and does not pay its price, but delivers to the principal the price he obtains from the sale of the thing to a third person, and if he does not succeed in selling it, he returns it. By virtue of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, the latter, on receiving the beds, was necessarily obliged to pay their price within the term fixed, without any other consideration and regardless as to whether he had or had not sold the beds. Only the acts of the contracting parties, subsequent to, and in connection with, the execution of the contract, must be considered for the purpose of interpreting the contract, when such interpretation is necessary, but not when, as in the instant case, its essential agreements are clearly set forth and plainly show that the contract belongs to a certain kind and not to another. Furthermore, the return made was of certain brass beds, and was not effected in exchange for the price paid for them, but was for other beds of another kind; and for the letter Exhibit L-1, requested the plaintiff's prior consent with respect to said beds, which sho

ws that it was not considered that the defendant had a right, by virtue of the contract, to make this return. As regards the shipment of beds without previous notice, it is insinuated in the record that these brass beds were precisely the ones so shipped, and that, for this very reason, the plaintiff agreed to their return. And with respect to the so-called commissions, we have said that they merely constituted a discount on the invoice price, and the reason for applying this benefit to the beds sold directly by the plaintiff to persons in Iloilo was because, as the defendant obligated itself in the contract to incur the expenses of advertisement of the plaintiff's beds, such sales were to be considered as a result of that advertisement.

In respect to the defendant's obligation to order by the dozen, the only one expressly imposed by the contract, the effect of its breach would only entitle the plaintiff to disregard the orders which the defendant might place under other conditions; but if the plaintiff consents to fill them, he waives his right and cannot complain for having acted thus at his own free will.